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The generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) is a generalization of the
standard Nash equilibrium problem (NEP), in which each player’s strategy set
may depend on the rival players’ strategies. The GNEP has recently drawn much
attention because of its capability of modeling a number of interesting conflict
situations in, for example, an electricity market and an international pollution
control. However, a GNEP usually has multiple or even infinitely many solutions,
and it is not a trivial matter to choose a meaningful solution from those equilibria.
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First we present an incremental penalty
method for the broad class of GNEPs and show that it can find a GNE under
suitable conditions. Next, we formally define the restricted GNE for the GNEPs
with shared constraints and propose a controlled penalty method, which includes
the incremental penalty method as a subprocedure, to compute a restricted GNE.
Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the proposed approach.
Key words. Generalized Nash equilibrium, shared constraints, shadow price, penalty
method, restricted GNE.
1 Introduction
The generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) is a generalization of the standard
Nash equilibrium problem (NEP), in which each player’s strategy set may depend on
the rivals’ strategies. The early study of such games dates back at least to Debreu [6]
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and Arrow and Debreu [1], where a GNEP was called a social equilibrium (problem) or
an abstract economy. Rosen [29] considered a special class of GNEPs where all players
share common constraints. Harker [15] studied GNEPs via a variational inequality
(VI) or a quasi-variational inequality (QVI) reformulation. More recently, Pang and
Fukushima [25] proposed some GNEP formulations of multi-leader-follower games.
GNEPs have been used to model various problems in applications. Robinson [27, 28]
analyzed the so-called measure of effectiveness in a combat model by formulating the
model as a GNEP. Wei and Smeers [30] considered a GNEP constructed from a spatial
oligopolistic electricity model and proposed a variational inequality approach to de-
termine a solution of the model. Hobbs and Pang [18] treated oligopolistic electricity
models with joint constraints by means of linear complementarity formulations. Con-
treras, Klusch and Krawczyk [5] also solved electrical market games by way of GNEP
formulations. Breton, Zaccour and Zahaf [4] analyzed the joint implementation mech-
anism of environmental projects by formulating the model as a GNEP. Kesselman,
Leonardi and Bonafici [19] dealt with an internet switching problem where users be-
have selfishly (see [8] for a more rigorous formulation of the model). Pang, Scutari,
Facchinei and Wang [26] formulated a power allocation problem in parallel interference
channels as a GNEP.
We should remark here that the GNE has often been criticized by the economists as
a plausible solution concept of a meaningful economic game, because a GNE is not self-
enforceable unlike a Nash equilibrium. Nevertheless the GNEP has steadily expanded
the area of applications as mentioned above. In particular, a fairly large portion of the
recent study on GNEPs focuses on engineering applications where the aim is to design
a well balanced system from a game-theoretic viewpoint [19, 26]. Moreover, in some
economic applications, the GNEP model has been used to design Pigovian taxes, by
means of which the regulatory authority may induce the agents to satisfy the common
constraints under a non-cooperative setting (see, e.g., [16] and the last paragraph of
Section 6 in this paper).
Numerical methods for GNEPs have been developed with different objectives and
problem settings. It is well known that a GNEP can be represented as a QVI [15,
25]. By using a gap function for QVIs [13], a GNEP can be further reformulated
as an optimization problem whose minimum value is zero. We may apply a global
optimization method to solve the latter problem. Instead of a gap function, we may use
the so-called Nikaido-Isoda function [24] to reformulate a GNEP into an optimization
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problem with zero minimum value. Another approach is to transform a GNEP into a
sequence of NEPs by penalizing those constraints which depend on the other players’
strategies, and then solve the resulting NEPs through a VI reformulation [25, 12].
A GNEP usually has multiple or even infinitely many solutions. The above-
mentioned approaches will find an arbitrary GNE among them. A GNEP with shared,
or coupled, constraints is a special but important class of GNEPs. This class of GNEPs
was studied by Rosen [29], in which the solution concept called a normalized equilib-
rium was defined. A normalized equilibrium can be computed by solving a certain VI
problem [8, 30] or a certain optimization problem involving a Nikaido-Isoda-type func-
tion [17, 22]. Parametrized VI approaches are developed to systematically generate as
many GNEs as possible [23]. For more details about numerical methods for GNEPs,
see [10, 21].
As mentioned above, a GNEP usually has many solutions and the uniqueness of a
GNE is expected only under very restrictive assumptions. If there are many GNEs, it
will not be enough to find just an arbitrary GNE, since other GNEs may also provide
reasonable outcomes of the game. In such a case, we could try to find all GNEs or as
many GNEs as possible [23]. An alternative approach is to single out a GNE that has
some special property. The normalized equilibrium is such a GNE that the Lagrange
multipliers (shadow prices) associated with the shared constraints are equal among
all players up to constant factors, and its uniqueness is guaranteed under appropriate
conditions [29].
Although such a requirement on the shadow prices may be reasonable in some
situations, we may also consider the general case where the relative values of different
resources for one player are different from those for another player; for example, we
may require that the ratio of shadow prices associated with the common resources is
neither too large nor too small for every pair of players. To this end, we will introduce
a new solution concept called a restricted GNE. The restricted GNE can naturally be
regarded as an extension of Rosen’s normalized equilibrium [29], and in fact the latter
can be characterized as a special case of the former. Although a restricted GNE may
not be unique in general, we may expect that it affords useful insights into outcomes
of the GNEP, since it is endowed with more specific features than arbitrary GNEs.
Moreover the restricted GNE model may provide a more flexible design tool than the
normalized equilibrium model in a subtle conflict situation.
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The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First we present an incremental penalty
method for the broad class of GNEPs and show that it can find a GNE under suitable
conditions. Next, we formally define the restricted GNE for the GNEPs with shared
constraints and propose a controlled penalty method, which includes the incremental
penalty method as a subprocedure, to compute a restricted GNE. Numerical examples
are provided to illustrate the proposed approach.
Notations: The nonnegative and positive orthants in <n are denoted by <n+ := {x ∈
<n | x ≥ 0} and <n++ := {x ∈ <n | x > 0}, respectively. All vectors are column vectors.
However, a vector formed by concatenating several vectors, say x, y, . . . , z, is often
denoted as (x, y, . . . , z) instead of (xT , yT , . . . , zT )T , where T denotes transposition.
2 Generalized Nash Equilibrium
We consider a non-cooperative game with N players, and call the νth player simply
player ν. Let xν denote an nν-vector representing a strategy of player ν, where nν
is a positive integer. All players’ strategies are collectively denoted by a tuple x =
(x1, . . . , xN) ∈ <n, where n = n1 + · · · + nN . When we focus on the strategy of a
particular player, say ν, among N players, we often write x = (xν , x−ν), where x−ν
denotes the (n − nν)-vector (x1, . . . , xν−1, xν+1, . . . , xN) that represents the strategies
of all players except ν. We will also write n−ν = n− nν .
Throughout the paper, we will consider the GNEP where each player ν solves the
following optimization problem with the other players’ strategies x−ν being regarded
as exogenous:
Pν(x
−ν) : minimize f ν(xν , x−ν)
subject to gνi (x
ν , x−ν) ≤ 0, i = 1, . . . ,mν ,
hνj (x
ν) ≤ 0, j = 1, . . . , lν ,
where f ν : <n → <, gνi : <n → <, i = 1, . . . ,mν , hνj : <nν → <, j = 1, . . . , lν are
continuously differentiable functions such that f ν(·, x−ν) and gνi (·, x−ν), i = 1, . . . ,mν
are convex for each fixed x−ν ∈ <n−ν , and hνj , j = 1, . . . , lν are convex. Thus, problems
Pν(x
−ν) are convex programming problems for all ν = 1, . . . , N .
For ν = 1, . . . , N , let gν : <n → <mν and hν : <nν → <lν denote the vector-valued
functions whose components are gνi , i = 1, . . . ,mν and h
ν
j , j = 1, . . . , lν , respectively.
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Moreover, let Xν ⊆ <nν and X ⊆ <n be defined by




Then the player ν’s problem can simply be written as
Pν(x
−ν) : minimize f ν(xν , x−ν)
subject to gν(xν , x−ν) ≤ 0,
xν ∈ Xν .
The GNEP is to find a tuple x∗ = (x∗,1, . . . , x∗,N) such that x∗,ν solves problem
Pν(x
∗,−ν) for each ν = 1, . . . , N . Any such tuple is called a generalized Nash equi-
librium or GNE for short.
Notice that the constraints of Pν(x
∗,−ν) depend on the other players’ strategies
x−ν . The constraints gν(xν , x−ν) ≤ 0 will particularly be referred to as the dependent
constraints. If the dependent constraints do not exist in any player’s problem, then
the GNEP reduces to the classical NEP, and a GNE is nothing but a Nash equilibrium
(NE).
3 Assumptions and KKT Systems
For the system of inequalities defining the constraints of problems Pν(x
−ν), ν =
1, . . . , N , we say that the extended Mangasarian-Fromovitz constraint qualification
(e-MFCQ) holds at x = (x1, . . . , xN) ∈ X if there exists a vector z = (z1, . . . , zN) ∈ <n
such that
∇xνgνi (xν , x−ν)T zν < 0, ∀ i ∈ Iν(xν , x−ν), ν = 1, . . . , N,
∇hνj (xν)T zν < 0, ∀ j ∈ Jν(xν), ν = 1, . . . , N,
where the index sets Iν(xν , x−ν) and Jν(xν) are defined by
Iν(xν , x−ν) := {i | gνi (xν , x−ν) ≥ 0} ⊆ {1, . . . ,mν},
Jν(xν) := {j |hνj (xν) = 0} ⊆ {1, . . . , lν}
for each ν = 1, . . . , N . By a theorem of the alternative, the e-MFCQ can equivalently
be stated as follows: For ν = 1, . . . , N , if∑
i∈Iν(xν ,x−ν)
λνi∇xνgνi (xν , x−ν) +
∑
j∈Jν(xν)
µνj∇hνj (xν) = 0
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holds for some λνi ≥ 0, i ∈ Iν(xν , x−ν), and µνj ≥ 0, j ∈ Jν(xν), then we must have
λνi = 0, i ∈ Iν(xν , x−ν),
µνj = 0, j ∈ Jν(xν).
As the name suggests, the e-MFCQ is an extension of the Mangasarian-Fromovitz
constraint qualification (MFCQ), which is one of the most popular constraint quali-
fications in constrained optimization [3]. The MFCQ is usually assumed to hold at
an optimal solution in order to ensure the existence of Lagrange multipliers satisfy-
ing the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. The MFCQ is regarded as a weak
condition that normally holds at any feasible solution except for pathological cases.
Notice that the e-MFCQ is concerned with a point x that satisfies the individual
constraints hν(xν) ≤ 0, ν = 1, . . . , N , but not necessarily the dependent constraints
gν(xν , x−ν) ≤ 0, ν = 1, . . . , N . Like the MFCQ, the e-MFCQ may also be considered
a mild requirement for the constraints of the optimization problems Pν(x
−ν). The e-
MFCQ will play a crucial role in establishing the finite convergence property of the
algorithm presented in the next section (see Theorem 4.1).
Throughout we make the following assumptions on the constraints of the GNEP:
(A1) For each ν = 1, . . . , N , Xν is nonempty and compact.
(A2) The e-MFCQ holds at any x ∈ X.
For ν = 1, . . . , N , the KKT conditions for problem Pν(x
−ν) can be written as
KKTν : ∇xνf ν(xν , x−ν) +
mν∑
i=1
λνi∇xνgνi (xν , x−ν) +
lν∑
j=1
µνj∇hνj (xν) = 0,
λνi ≥ 0, gνi (xν , x−ν) ≤ 0, λνi gνi (xν , x−ν) = 0, i = 1, . . . ,mν ,
µνj ≥ 0, hνj (xν) ≤ 0, µνjhνj (xν) = 0, j = 1, . . . , lν ,
where λνi and µ
ν
j are Lagrange multipliers. It will be convenient to denote the vectors
of Lagrange multipliers as λν = (λν1, . . . , λ
ν
mν ) and µ
ν = (µν1, . . . , µ
ν
lν
) for each ν =
1, . . . , N .
Since Pν(x
−ν) is a convex programming problem, KKTν is a necessary and sufficient
optimality condition for Pν(x
−ν) under a suitable constraint qualification (including the
e-MFCQ). Therefore, a tuple x = (x1, . . . , xN) is a GNE if and only if it satisfies the
system formed by concatenating KKTν for all ν = 1, . . . , N , which we call the KKT
system associated with the GNEP.
6
4 Penalized Reformulation as NEP
For each ν = 1, . . . , N , let us consider the following problem in which the depen-
dent constraints in Pν(x
−ν) are penalized with positive penalty parameters ρν =












subject to hνj (x
ν) ≤ 0, j = 1, . . . , lν ,
where gνi (x
ν , x−ν)+ := max{0, gνi (xν , x−ν)}. This is an adaptation of an exact penalty
technique in nonlinear programming [7, 14] for the GNEP under consideration. Note,
however, that violation of the constraints is penalized by using their respective pa-
rameters ρνi , unlike the conventional penalty technique where the aggregate constraint
violation is penalized by using a single penalty parameter. This somewhat exagger-
ated usage of penalty parameters will play an essential role in designing the controlled
penalty method for finding a restricted GNE later in this paper.
The game in which each player ν solves Qν(x
−ν ; ρν) is a NEP, since the constraints
in Qν(x
−ν ; ρν) do not involve the other players’ strategies. We denote ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρN)
and refer to this game as NEP(ρ).
Note that Qν(x
−ν ; ρν) is a convex programming problem for each ν. Specifically,
the objective function is continuous in (xν , x−ν) and convex with respect to xν for
each fixed x−ν , and the feasible set xν is nonempty and compact by Assumption (A1).
Hence NEP(ρ) has an equilibrium for any ρ, see e.g., Theorem 1 in [2, §9.1].
By introducing artificial variables ξνi , i = 1, . . . ,mν , Qν(x
−ν ; ρν) can be rewritten
as
Qν(x






subject to ξνi ≥ gνi (xν , x−ν), i = 1, . . . ,mν ,
ξνi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,mν ,
hνj (x
ν) ≤ 0, j = 1, . . . , lν .
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The KKT conditions for problem Qν(x
−ν ; ρν) may be written as follows:
∇xνf ν(xν , x−ν) +
mν∑
i=1
λνi∇xνgνi (xν , x−ν) +
lν∑
j=1
µνj∇hνj (xν) = 0,
ρνi − λνi − βνi = 0, i = 1, . . . ,mν ,
ξνi ≥ gνi (xν , x−ν), λνi ≥ 0, λνi (ξνi − gνi (xν , x−ν)) = 0, i = 1, . . . ,mν ,
ξνi ≥ 0, βνi ≥ 0, βνi ξνi = 0, i = 1, . . . ,mν ,
hνj (x
ν) ≤ 0, µνj ≥ 0, µνjhνj (xν) = 0, j = 1, . . . , lν ,
(1)
where λν = (λνi ), β
ν = (βνi ), µ
ν = (µνi ) are Lagrange multipliers. By eliminating β
ν ,
we may rewrite (1) as
∇xνf ν(xν , x−ν) +
mν∑
i=1
λνi∇xνgνi (xν , x−ν) +
lν∑
j=1
µνj∇hνj (xν) = 0,
0 ≤ λνi ≤ ρνi , i = 1, . . . ,mν ,
ξνi ≥ gνi (xν , x−ν), ξνi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,mν ,
λνi > 0 ⇒ ξνi = gνi (xν , x−ν), i = 1, . . . ,mν ,
λνi < ρ
ν
i ⇒ ξνi = 0, i = 1, . . . ,mν ,
hνj (x
ν) ≤ 0, µνj ≥ 0, µνjhνj (xν) = 0, j = 1, . . . , lν .
(2)
Notice that we must have ξνi = max{0, gνi (xν , x−ν)} for all i = 1, . . . ,mν at an optimal
solution of problem Qν(x
−ν ; ρν). This fact implies
ξνi = 0 ⇒ gνi (xν , x−ν) ≤ 0 (3)
and
ξνi > 0 ⇒ gνi (xν , x−ν) > 0. (4)
Therefore, if ξνi = 0 for all i, then by (3), the solution x
ν of the penalty problem
Qν(x
−ν ; ρν) is feasible to problem Pν(x−ν), and hence optimal to Pν(x−ν). However, if
ξνi > 0 for some i, then by (4), the solution x
ν of the penalty problem Qν(x
−ν ; ρν) is
infeasible to problem Pν(x




i holds by the com-
plementarity condition in (1). From these observations, we may naturally expect that
the feasibility is restored by increasing those penalty parameters ρνi which correspond
to the constraints such that ξνi = g
ν
i (x
ν , x−ν) > 0. In fact, if ρνi is sufficiently large and
ρνi > λ
ν
i holds at an optimal solution of Qν(x
−ν ; ρν), then we have ξνi = 0 by (2) and
hence the constraint gνi (x
ν , x−ν) ≤ 0 in Pν(x−ν) will be satisfied.
We state an algorithm for finding a GNE by solving a sequence of NEPs.
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Incremental Penalty Algorithm
Step 0. Choose initial penalty parameters ρ0,νi > 0 and small positive constants ∆
ν
i
for i = 1, . . . ,mν , ν = 1, . . . , N . Set k := 0.
Step 1. Find a NE xk = (xk,1, . . . , xk,N) of NEP(ρk) with ρk = (ρk,νi ). Let λ
k = (λk,νi ),
µk = (µk,νj ) and ξ
k = (ξk,νi ) be vectors of Lagrange multipliers and artificial
variables that along with xk satisfy the KKT conditions (2) for ν = 1, . . . , N .
Step 2. If ξk,νi = 0 for all i = 1, . . . ,mν and ν = 1, . . . , N , then terminate.











where ∆k,νi are chosen so that ∆
k,ν
i ≥ ∆νi . Go to Step 1.
We give a basic convergence result for the Incremental Penalty Algorithm.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that Assumptions (A1) and (A2) are satisfied. Then the Incre-
mental Penalty Algorithm terminates after a finite number of iterations and produces
a solution of the GNEP.
Proof. If the algorithm terminates at the kth iteration, then we have ξk,νi = 0,
and hence gνi (x
k,ν , xk,−ν) ≤ 0 for i = 1, . . . ,mν , ν = 1, . . . , N . This implies that
xk,ν solves not only Qν(x
k,−ν ; ρk,ν) but also Pν(xk,−ν) for every ν = 1, . . . , N . Con-
sequently, xk,1, . . . , xk,N comprise a GNE. Now suppose that the algorithm does not
terminate finitely. Let us define the index sets Jk = {(ν, i) | ξk,νi > 0, i = 1, . . . ,mν , ν =
1, . . . , N}. Then Jk 6= ∅ for all k and there exists an infinite subsequence {Jk}k∈K such
that Jk are identical for all k ∈ K. Let Jk = J∗ for all k ∈ K. Then by the update
rule of penalty parameters, we have ρk,νi → ∞ for each (ν, i) ∈ J∗. Since λk,νi = ρk,νi
for (ν, i) ∈ Jk, this implies that the sequence of Lagrange multipliers {(λk, µk)} is
unbounded. Denote rk = ‖(λk, µk)‖. Then we have rk → ∞, at least on some sub-
sequence. Since the sequence {xk} is bounded by Assumption (A1) and the sequence
{(λk, µk)/rk} is contained in the unit sphere and hence is also bounded, dividing both




λˆνi∇xνgνi (xˆν , xˆ−ν) +
lν∑
j=1
µˆνj∇hνj (xˆν) = 0
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for all ν = 1, . . . , N , where xˆ and (λˆ, µˆ) are accumulation points of the sequences
{xk} and {(λk, µk)/rk}, respectively. Note that ‖(λˆ, µˆ)‖ = 1 and hence (λˆ, µˆ) 6= (0, 0).
Moreover, it is not difficult to see that λˆνi ≥ 0 for any (ν, i) such that gνi (xˆν , xˆ−ν) ≥ 0
and µˆνj ≥ 0 for any (ν, j) such that hνj (xˆν) = 0, while λˆνi = 0 for any (ν, i) such that
gνi (xˆ
ν , xˆ−ν) < 0 and µˆνj = 0 for any (ν, j) such that h
ν
j (xˆ
ν) < 0. Then it follows from
Assumption (A2) that λˆνi and µˆ
ν
j are all zero. This is a contradiction, and hence the
algorithm must terminate finitely. ¤
5 Restricted GNEs
Theorem 4.1 ensures that the Incremental Penalty Algorithm finds a GNE. However
the GNEP generally has multiple or often infinitely many equilibria. It would therefore
be useful to extract those GNEs from the whole set of GNEs which are of significance in
some sense, and try to find such a GNE rather than an arbitrary GNE. In this section,
we introduce a new concept of GNE in which some additional conditions are imposed
on the Lagrange multipliers for the dependent constraints.
In the remainder of the paper, we restrict ourselves to the special subclass of GNEPs
where the dependent constraints in each player’s problem originate from some common
constraints. Specifically, we assume that player ν’s problem is given by
P¯ν(x
−ν) : minimize f ν(xν , x−ν)
subject to gi(x
ν , x−ν) ≤ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m,
hνj (x
ν) ≤ 0, j = 1, . . . , lν ,
where gi : <n → <, i = 1 . . . ,m are continuously differentiable and gi(·, x−ν) : <nν →
<, i = 1, . . . ,m are convex for each fixed x−ν ∈ <n−ν , and f ν and hνj , j = 1, . . . , lν
are same as before. The difference between P¯ν(x
−ν) and Pν(x−ν) is that the dependent
constraint functions gi, i = 1, . . . ,m in P¯ν(x
−ν) are common to all players’ problems.
The GNEP of this type, which was explicitly introduced by Rosen [29], will be referred
to as the GNEP with shared constraints. The GNEP with shared constraints plays
an important role in modeling some interesting problems such as electricity market,
communication, internet switching and environmental problems [4, 5, 19, 26, 30], and
has recently been studied by a number of authors [8, 9, 17, 20, 22].
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The KKT conditions for problems P¯ν(x
−ν), ν = 1, . . . , N can be written as
KKTν : ∇xνf ν(xν , x−ν) +
m∑
i=1
λνi∇xνgi(xν , x−ν) +
lν∑
j=1
µνj∇hνj (xν) = 0,
λνi ≥ 0, gi(xν , x−ν) ≤ 0, λνi gi(xν , x−ν) = 0, i = 1, . . . ,m,
µνj ≥ 0, hνj (xν) ≤ 0, µνjhνj (xν) = 0, j = 1, . . . , lν .
Similarly to the general GNEP, KKTν is a necessary and sufficient optimality condition
for P¯ν(x
−ν) under a suitable constraint qualification, and hence a tuple x = (x1, . . . , xN)
is a GNE if and only if it along with some Lagrange multipliers λ = (λνi ) ∈ <mN and
µ = (µνj ) ∈ <l1+···+lN satisfies the system formed by concatenating KKTν , ν = 1, . . . , N .
Note that when the ith shared constraint gi(x) ≤ 0 is inactive at a GNE, the com-
plementarity condition in KKTν implies that the corresponding Lagrange multiplier is
zero in each player’s problem, i.e., λνi = 0 for all ν = 1, . . . , N .
As mentioned earlier, there are in general (often infinitely) many GNEs in the
game. This may be regarded as a kind of weakness of the GNEP model, since it does
not provide clear explanation of possible outcomes of the model. Therefore we may try
to give a characterization of particular GNEs that are supposed to have some distinctive
features. We will do this by imposing a certain additional condition on the Lagrange
multipliers λ = (λνi ) ∈ <mN associated with the shared constraints. Specifically we
introduce the new solution concept of the restricted generalized Nash equilibrium.
Let Λ be a nonempty cone in <mN+ . A tuple x = (x1, . . . , xN) is said to be a Λ-
restricted GNE, or simply a restricted GNE, if there exist Lagrange multipliers λ =
(λνi ) ∈ <mN and µ = (µνj ) ∈ <l1+···+lN that satisfy KKTν , ν = 1, . . . , N , together with
the additional condition
λ = (λνi ) ∈ Λ.
Obviously, any restricted GNE is a GNE, but the converse is in general not true.
The class of restricted GNEs contains as a special case the normalized equilibrium
introduced by Rosen [29]. Recall that x = (xν) is called a normalized equilibrium if




iβ, i = 1, . . . ,m, (5)
for some β = (βν) ∈ <N++ and λ0i ∈ <+, i = 1, . . . ,m, where λi = (λ1i , . . . , λNi ) ∈ <N ,
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{λ0iβ ∈ <N+ | λ0i ≥ 0} ⊆ <mN ,
which is also written as
Λmβ =
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
Λβ × · · · × Λβ,
where Λβ = {tβ | t ≥ 0} is the half line in <N emanating from the origin and passing
through the point β ∈ <N++. Then we can easily see that a Λmβ -restricted GNE is
nothing but a normalized equilibrium. It is shown in [29] that a Λmβ -restricted GNE
exists for every given β ∈ <N++, as long as the game has a nonempty feasible set
{x ∈ X | gi(x) ≤ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m}. (Note that the set X is nonempty and compact by











is strictly monotone, then the Λmβ -restricted GNE is unique [29].
Note that (5) can be rewritten as
λνi = β
νλ0i , i = 1 . . . ,m, ν = 1, . . . , N,
that is,
λν = βνλ0, ν = 1, . . . , N, (6)
where λν = (λν1, . . . , λ
ν
m) ∈ <m and λ0 = (λ01, . . . , λ0m) ∈ <m. The relation (6) implies
that the Lagrange multiplier vectors λν ∈ <m associated with the shared constraints
are equal among all players ν = 1, . . . , N , up to constant factors βν . In economic
terms, this means that the relative values of shadow prices associated with the common
resources are identical for all players at any normalized equilibrium. Such a requirement
may be appropriate in some situations, but it may often be too strong, because the
relative values of different resources for one player may be different from those for
another player. The cone Λ used to define the Λ-restricted GNE may represent various
conditions that we require a GNE to meet. For example, we may require that the ratio
of shadow prices associated with the common resources is neither too large nor too
12













1 ≤ ν < ν ′ ≤ N, i = 1, . . . ,m, (7)
where δi and δi are given positive numbers such that δi ≤ 1 ≤ δi for i = 1, . . . ,m.















1 ≤ ν < ν ′ ≤ N, i = 1, . . . ,m,
where βi = (β
ν
i ) ∈ <N++, i = 1, . . . ,m are given vectors.
These conditions can readily be included in the representation of the cone Λ to
specify restricted GNEs. Although a restricted GNE may not be unique in general, we
may expect that a restricted GNE provides useful insights into outcomes of the GNEP,
since it is endowed with more specific features than mere GNEs.
Another important question is about the existence of restricted GNEs. As men-
tioned earlier in this section, a restricted GNE exists in the special case where Λ is
given by the cone Λmβ with β ∈ <N++. Therefore, more generally, the set of Λ-restricted
GNEs is nonempty as long as Λ ⊇ Λmβ for some β ∈ <N++.
6 Computing a Restricted GNE
In this section, we consider the GNEP with shared constraints, i.e., the GNEP in
which each player ν solves P¯ν(x
−ν), and present a heuristic method for computing a
Λ-restricted GNE by solving a sequence of NEPs obtained through penalized reformu-
lation of the GNEP. The basic idea underlying the method is to adjust the penalty
parameters ρ = (ρi) so that not only the feasibility is achieved for each player’s prob-
lem but also the Lagrange multipliers λ = (λνi ) associated with the shared constraints
are led to satisfy the condition λ ∈ Λ.





where Λi is a nonempty cone such that Λi \ {0} ⊆ <N++ for each i = 1, . . . ,m.
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For each ν = 1, . . . , N , the penalty problem related to player ν’s problem P¯ν(x
−ν)
can be written as
Q¯ν(x





subject to hνj (x
ν) ≤ 0, j = 1, . . . , lν .
The game in which each player ν solves Q¯ν(x
−ν ; ρν) is a NEP, which will be referred
to as NEP(ρ). The KKT conditions for Q¯ν(x
−ν ; ρν) are given by
∇xνf ν(xν , x−ν) +
m∑
i=1
λνi∇xνgi(xν , x−ν) +
lν∑
j=1
µνj∇hνj (xν) = 0,
0 ≤ λνi ≤ ρνi , i = 1, . . . ,m,
ξνi ≥ gi(xν , x−ν), ξνi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m,
λνi > 0 ⇒ ξνi = gi(xν , x−ν), i = 1, . . . ,m,
λνi < ρ
ν
i ⇒ ξνi = 0, i = 1, . . . ,m,
hνj (x
ν) ≤ 0, µνj ≥ 0, µνjhνj (xν) = 0, j = 1, . . . , lν .
(8)
Note that, at a solution x = (x1, . . . , xN) of NEP(ρ), we must have ξνi = max{0, gi(x)},
ν = 1, . . . , N for each i = 1, . . . ,m, and hence we have ξ1i = · · · = ξNi for all i =
1, . . . ,m. Moreover, the following relations hold for each i = 1, . . . ,m:
gi(x) < 0 ⇒ ξνi = 0, λνi = 0, ν = 1, . . . , N,
gi(x) > 0 ⇒ ξνi > 0, λνi = ρνi , ν = 1, . . . , N,
gi(x) = 0 ⇒ ξνi = 0, 0 ≤ λνi ≤ ρνi , ν = 1, . . . , N.
(9)
The relations (9) indicate that if the ith shared constraint gi(x) ≤ 0 is violated at a
solution of NEP(ρ), then the Lagrange multipliers λνi and the penalty parameters ρ
ν
i
are equal in all players’ problems.
This observation suggests that a Λ-restricted GNE might be obtained by solving a
sequence of NEP(ρ)’s, where an initial ρ is sufficiently small and belongs to Λ, and sub-
sequently, those components of ρ which correspond to the violated shared constraints
at a computed NE are increased in such a way that the condition ρ ∈ Λ is maintained.
By the convergence theorem for the Incremental Penalty Algorithm (Theorem 4.1), all
the shared constraints are satisfied eventually, and a GNE is obtained. Then we check
whether the Lagrange multipliers λi = (λ
ν
i ) associated with the shared constraints be-
long to the cones Λi, i = 1, . . . ,m. If any of λi’s fails to belong to Λi, then we decrease
the corresponding penalty parameters ρi = (ρ
ν




Step 0. Choose the initial penalty parameter ρ0 = (ρ0i ) ∈ Λ \ {0}, where ρ0i = (ρ0,νi ) ∈
<N . Set k := 0.
Step 1. Find a NE xk = (xk,1, . . . , xk,N) of NEP(ρk). Let λk = (λk,νi ), µ
k = (µk,νj )
and ξk = (ξk,νi ) be vectors of Lagrange multipliers and artificial variables that
along with xk satisfy the KKT conditions (8) for all ν = 1, . . . , N . (Note that
ξk,νi = ξ¯
k
i := max{0, gi(xk)}, ν = 1, . . . , N for each i = 1, . . . ,m, as mentioned
above.)
Step 2. If ξ¯ki = 0 for all i = 1, . . . ,m, then a GNE is obtained; go to Step 4. Otherwise,
go to Step 3.











where ∆ki = (∆
k,ν
i ) ∈ <N++ is chosen so that ρki +∆ki ∈ Λi. Let k := k + 1 and go
to Step 1.
Step 4. If λki ∈ Λi for all i = 1, . . . ,m, a Λ-restricted GNE is obtained; terminate.








ρki −∆ki if λki 6= ρki ,
where ∆ki = (∆
k,ν
i ) ∈ <N++ is chosen so that ρki − ∆ki ∈ Λi. (Note that λki 6= ρki
means λk,νi < ρ
k,ν
i for some ν.) Let k := k + 1 and go to Step 1.
If ρ0i , i = 1, . . . ,m are chosen sufficiently small, we may anticipate that, at a solution
of NEP(ρ0), ξ¯0i > 0 for all shared constraints that are violated at a GNE. From the
update rule of the penalty parameters, we have ρki = (ρ
k,ν
i ) ∈ Λi, i = 1, . . . ,m at every
iteration k. By (9), the Lagrange multipliers λki are equal to the penalty parameters
ρki for the violated shared constraints, i.e., for all i such that ξ¯
k
i > 0. Thus Step 3
of the algorithm tries to guide the Lagrange multipliers λki toward Λi by increasing
the penalty parameter ρki . Eventually the shared constraints will be all satisfied, i.e.,
ξ¯ki = 0 for all i = 1, . . . ,m, and the solution at hand is a GNE (cf. Theorem 4.1). If
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the Lagrange multipliers λk actually belong to Λ, then we are done. The GNE is in
fact a Λ-restricted GNE. Otherwise, there exists at least one shared constraint such
that λki 6= ρki . Then we reduce the corresponding penalty parameter ρi and repeat the
incremental penalty procedure.
The above procedure may be interpreted as follows: We try to compel the players
to meet the shared constraints by applying Pigovian taxes, so that the resulting Nash
equilibrium turns out to be a GNE in the original game. Moreover, by adaptively
adjusting tax rates (penalty parameters) not only for each constraint but also for each
player individually, a sequence of Nash equilibria is generated, which may be expected
to converge to a restricted GNE specified by the cone Λ.
7 Numerical Results
We have implemented the Controlled Penalty Algorithm for finding a restricted GNE.
In Step 1 of the algorithm, a Nash equilibrium xk of NEP(ρk) is computed by applying a
generalized Newton method with the Fischer-Burmeister function [11, Subsection 9.1.1]
to the complementarity problem that represents the KKT conditions for NEP(ρk).
In our numerical experiments, we used the river basin pollution game [22, Subsec-
tion 5.3.1]. In this game, there are three players and the problem of player ν ∈ {1, 2, 3}
is given by
Pν(x
−ν) : minimize (cνxν + 0.01(x1 + x2 + x3)− χν)xν
subject to xν ≥ 0,
3.25x1 + 1.25x2 + 4.125x3 ≤ 100,
2.2915x1 + 1.5625x2 + 2.8125x3 ≤ 100,
with c1 = 0.01, c2 = 0.05, c3 = 0.01, χ1 = 2.9, χ2 = 2.88, χ3 = 2.85. This GNEP has
two shared constraints
g1(x) := 3.25x
1 + 1.25x2 + 4.125x3 ≤ 100,
g2(x) := 2.2915x
1 + 1.5625x2 + 2.8125x3 ≤ 100.
Each player ν has Lagrange multipliers λν := (λν1, λ
ν
2)
T ∈ <2 associated with these
shared constraints. The subproblem solved in Step 1 at every iteration can be repre-
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sented as a linear complementarity problem with 15 variables


















































, 1 ≤ ν ≤ ν ′ ≤ 3
}
(10)
with β := (β1, β2, β3)T = (3, 4, 5)T ∈ <3. With this choice of Λ2β ⊆ <6, the Λ2β-
restricted GNE is equivalent to the normalized equilibrium with β = (3, 4, 5)T (see
(5)). In the algorithm, we set the initial penalty parameter ρ0 = (ρ01, ρ
0
2) ∈ <6 to
be ρ01 = (0.3, 0.4, 0.5)
T and ρ02 = (0.15, 0.2, 0.25)
T . In Step 3 of the kth iteration, we
update the penalty parameters as
ρk+1i :=
{





i = 1, 2.




∣∣∣∣ < 106 i = 1, 2, ν, ν ′ = 1, 2, 3.
If these conditions are not met, the penalty parameters are updated as
ρk+1i :=
{
ρki if |λki − ρki | < 10−6
ρki /(1 + 0.2/k) otherwise,
i = 1, 2.
Notice that the condition ρk ∈ Λ2β is maintained for all k. In the course of computation,
the algorithm obtained many GNEs that were not a restricted GNE, and finally it
successfully terminated after 151 iterations by finding a Λ2β-restricted GNE, i.e., a
normalized equilibrium
(x1, x2, x3)T = (25.2181, 14.4329, 0.0000)T
and Lagrange multipliers of the three players
λ1 = (0.5375, 0.0000)T , λ2 = (0.7167, 0.0000)T , λ3 = (0.8959, 0.0000)T .
Note that the second shared constraint is inactive at the computed solution.
17




































, 1 ≤ ν ≤ ν ′ ≤ 3
}
(11)
with β := (β1, β2, β3)T = (3, 4, 5)T ∈ <3, (δ1, δ2)T = (0.8, 0.75)T and (δ1, δ2)T =
(1/δ1, 1/δ2)
T . We chose the same initial values of the penalty parameters as above,
i.e., ρ01 = (0.3, 0.4, 0.5)
T and ρ02 = (0.15, 0.2, 0.25)
T . Also we used the same penalty













, 1 ≤ ν < ν ′ ≤ 3, i = 1, 2.
The algorithm successfully obtained a restricted GNE at the 13th iteration. The re-
stricted GNE, which was actually the first GNE obtained in the course of computation,
and the corresponding Lagrange multipliers are
(x1, x2, x3)T = (25.0622, 14.8383, 0.0000)T ,
λ1 = (0.5382, 0.0000)T , λ2 = (0.6790, 0.0000)T , λ3 = (0.7276, 0.0000)T ,
which slightly differ from the normalized equilibrium and the corresponding Lagrange
multipliers obtained in the previous experiment. Note that the second shared constraint
is also inactive at the computed solution.
Next we solved the same problem except that Λ is given by (11) with β = (4, 3, 2)T .
The initial values of the penalty parameters were set to be ρ01 = (0.4, 0.3, 0.2)
T and
ρ02 = (0.4, 0.3, 0.2)
T . With the same penalty update rules and stopping conditions, the
algorithm found the following restricted GNE and Lagrange multipliers in 72 iterations:
(x1, x2, x3)T = (0.0000, 14.3915, 19.8814)T ,
λ1 = (0.9951, 0.0000)T , λ2 = (0.7634, 0.0000)T , λ3 = (0.5114, 0.0000)T .
When we set Λ as in (11) with β = (5, 3, 4)T and the initial values of the penalty
parameters were chosen as ρ01 = (0.5, 0.3, 0.4)
T and ρ02 = (0.25, 0.15, 0.2)
T , the algo-
rithm was able to find the following restricted GNE and Lagrange multipliers only in
4 iterations:
(x1, x2, x3)T = (14.6711, 17.7709, 7.2982)T ,
λ1 = (0.6346, 0.0000)T , λ2 = (0.4222, 0.0000)T , λ3 = (0.5592, 0.0000)T .
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We have also tested different choices of Λ and the algorithm was able to find a restricted
GNE in many cases. In particular, the second shared constraint was always inactive at
the computed restricted GNEs. This is consistent with the observation made in [23],
where the authors tried to find as many GNEs as possible and observed that the first
shared constraint was always active at computed GNEs, but the second was not.
The above numerical results with the controlled penalty algorithm are summarized
as follows. First we computed a (special) restricted GNE with Λ2β given by (10), which is
nothing but Rosen’s normalized equilibrium with weights β = (βν), and confirmed that
the algorithm successfully found it. Then we tried to compute more general restricted
GNEs where Λ is given by (11) with different values of β. Since those restricted GNEs
constitute a set of GNEs that contains a normalized equilibrium, finding one of those
restricted GNEs generally requires less computational effort than finding a normalized
equilibrium. However, it should also be mentioned that, for some choices of Λ, the
algorithm sometimes encountered a difficulty in finding a restricted GNE, although
many GNEs were found in the course of computation. Moreover, in other cases, the
subproblem NEP(ρk), which was reformulated as a linear complementarity problem,
could not be solved at some iterations, possibly due to the lack of monotonicity. It is
not clear whether those failures are attributed to a defect of the algorithm or the lack
of desirable properties in the problem (or subproblems) formulated with the chosen Λ.
8 Conclusion
Since there are usually too many GNEs, we have proposed a new solution concept called
a restricted GNE, which can be characterized by certain properties enjoyed by the
players’ Lagrange multipliers (shadow prices) associated with the shared constraints.
This concept contains as a special case the classical solution concept called a normalized
equilibrium. We have also proposed two algorithms; the incremental penalty algorithm
and the controlled penalty algorithm. The first algorithm is designed to find a GNE and
its convergence theorem is established. The second algorithm, which includes the first
algorithm as a subprocedure, is designed to find a restricted GNE and its computational
procedure can be regarded as a Pigovian taxation process. The second algorithm is a
heuristic method. Through numerical experiments on a simple GNEP, we have shown
that the algorithm can find a restricted GNE for various conditions imposed on the
Lagrange multipliers. However, the algorithm sometimes failed to obtain a restricted
19
GNE, which may be due to the nonexistence of a restricted GNE. As mentioned at
the end of Section 5, there exits a Λ-restricted GNE when Λ contains the cone Λmβ for
some β ∈ <++. It is a future subject to study existence conditions for restricted GNEs
under a more general choice of the cone Λ.
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